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When  economic  actors  are  also  allowed  to  become  politically  active,
perhaps  to  influence  a  government  price  policy,  they  face  decision  problems
with  essentially  simultaneous  political  and  economic  features.  If,  in
addition,  two  groups  struggle  to  pull  the  administered  price  level  in
opposite  directions,  an  important  strategic  component  is  introduced.  On  two
levels,  then,  such  situations  depart  from  the  competitive  economy  framework
of  Arrow  and  Debreu.  The  model  of  this  paper  is  designed  to reconcile  the
general  equilibrium  model  with  politically  active  interest  groups.  This
model  is  then  used  to assess  the  welfare  consequences  of  such  lobbying
activity.  We  find  that  very  often  a  lobbying  program  with  price  distortions
is  not  the  best  means  for  regulating  these  economies.  However,  there  may  be
cases  in  which  no  alternative  policy  could  achieve  the  outcome  resulting  from
the  lobbying  program.
Keywords:  Political  economy,  lobbying  behavior,  rent-seeking,
distortionary  policy.
iiON  THE  WELFARE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  POLITICAL  ACTIVITY
Jay  S.  Coggins
"For many  good reasons, politics and economics have  to be  held
together in  the analysts of  basic social mechanisms and systems."
C.  Lindblom,  1977,  p.  8
1.  INTRODUCTION
The  manner  in  which  distortionary  economic  policy,  implemented  by  a
central  political  authority,  alters  society's  aggregate  well-being  underlies
one  of  the  difficult  controversies  in  social  science  (Shepsle  and  Weingast,
1984;  Stigler,  1976).  These  waters  are  made  more  murky  when  one  attempts  to
account  for  the  additional  impact  of  citizens'  endeavors  to exert  control
over  their  government's  decision  on  the  matter  (Krueger,  1974).  An
enterprise  of  popular  current  interest  in  economics  attempts  to capture  the
full  effect  upon  economic  outcomes  of  populating  a  model  with  political
actors,  and  allowing  an  economic  policy  to  emerge  endogenously.
Many  interesting  social  phenomena  involve  fundamentally  simultaneous
considerations,  in  which  two  or  more  decisions  or  outcomes  feed  back  upon
each  other.  For  example,  according  to  one  view,  political,  economic,  and
social  institutions  are  the  vehicles  by  which  existing  societal  conditions
alter  and  shape  individuals'  attitudes  and  preferences  (March  and  Olsen,
1984).  When  these  institutions  change,  as,  for  example,  when  property  rights
systems  change,  the  beliefs  and  attitudes  of  individuals,  perhaps  slowly,  may
change  in  response.  However,  institutions  also  change  in  response  to  the
1An  alternative  view  is  presented  by  Riker  (1980)  and  Ostrom  (1986).
There,  institutions  are  only  aggregating  devices,  which  channel  the  actions
and  attitudes  of  individuals  into  collective  outcomes.attitudes  and  preferences  of  the  members  of  society.  In  this  sense,  then,  as
Gerber  and  Jackson  (1989)  point  out,  institutions  and  preferences  are
co-determined.  They  feed  back  on  one  another  in  an  essentially  simultaneous
fashion.
Another  related  simultaneity,  whose  spirit  animates  this  paper,  takes
place  at  the  individual  level.  People  who  choose  to  become  politically
active,  possibly  to effect  institutional  change  of the  sort  mentioned  above,
incur  some  cost  in  doing  so.  In  particular,  suppose  that  an  individual  or  a
group  of  individuals  may  lobby  a  governing  body,  in  an  attempt  to  achieve
legislation  establishing  an  economic  policy  which  favors  this  individual  or
group.  The  political  activity,  being  costly,  is  a  decision  variable  which
enters  an  economic  decision  problem.  However,  if  this  activity  is
successful-if  the  favorable  policy  is  installed-then  the  economic  decision
problem  itself  is  changed.  His  or  her  income  level,  perhaps,  has  moved  in
this  agent's  favor.  Now  the  simultaneity  is  apparent.  The  optimal  level  of
political  activity  depends  upon  economic  conditions,  which  in  turn  are
determined  by  the  policy  outcome,  which  is  affected  by  economic  conditions,
and  so  on.  This  situation  draws  us  beyond  the  province  of  the  usual  Arrow-
Debreu  general  equilibrium  model,  for  prices  are  no  longer  parametric.
Suppose  now  that  a  proposed  policy  promises  to  harm  and  to  help,
respectively,  two  groups  whose  interests  in  the  matter  are  opposed.  Each
group  must  solve  a  lobbying  problem  possessing  the  simultaneous  qualities
already  mentioned.  However,  the  conflicting  interests  bring  to  the  situation
2The  term  lobbying is  used  here  in  a  very  specific  sense.  It  shall  be
defined  as  any  activity  in  which  agents  or  groups  purposefully  expend
resources  to exert  self-interested  political  pressure  on  a  central  authority.
2an  important  strategic component.  This  conflict,  which  compels  each  side  to
take  its  opponent's  actions  into  account,  overarches  the  groups'  micro-level
lobbying  problems.  The  model  of  this  paper  is  designed  specifically  to
capture  these  two  ideas.  Individual  decision  problems  are  simultaneously
economic  and  political,  and  the  collective  problem  is strategic  in  that
individuals'  utility  levels  depend  upon  the  behavior  of  all  agents.
The  objectives  of  the  paper  are  twofold.  First,  by  comparing  the
outcome  of  our  lobbying  program  to  its perfectly  competitive  counterpart,  we
wish  to  learn,  in effect,  whether  lobbying  is  good  or  bad  for  society.
Second,  abandoning  the  competitive  equilibrium,  we  investigate  whether  our
government  (by  selecting  an  alternative  policy)  or  the  agents  themselves  (by
cooperating  or  forming  a  coalition)  might  choose  to overturn  the  lobbying
program  altogether.
The  welfare  question  appears  to  be  unresolved  in  the  literature.  The
public  choice  literature  begins,  for  the  most  part,  with  an  assertion  that
the  seeking  of  policy-created  rents  is  unavoidably  bad  for  society  (Buchanan,
1980;  see  also  Samuels  and  Mercuro,  1984,  p.  56).  This  view  seems  to  stem
from  Tullock  (1967),  who  claimed  that  the  seeking  of  rents  created  by
government  economic  policy  is  inherently  welfare-reducing.
Bhagwati's  (1982)  work  on  the  second  best  suggests  that  rent  seeking  may
be  welfare  enhancing  in  the  presence  of  certain  kinds  of  pre-existing  market
imperfections.  However,  he  also  asserts that  lobbying  is  unequivocally  bad
for  open  economies  in  which  tariff  revenues  are  sought  by  politically  active
interest  groups  (see,  e.g.,  Bhagwati,  et.al. (1984)).  Other  works  along
these  lines  include  Brock  and  Magee  (1975,  1978),  Mayer  (1984),  Young  and
Magee  (1986),  and  Hillman  and  Ursprung  (1988).  For  a  recent  survey  of  the
3theory  of  endogenously  determined  trade  policy,  the  reader  is  referred  to
Nelson  (1988).  The  approach  of  this  paper  is  designed  to  allow  a  fresh  look
at  these  issues.
The  model,  which  follows  that  of  Coggins  (1989),  may  be  summed  up  as
follows.  There  are  two  traders  who  have  preferences  over  two  goods  with
which  they  are  asymmetrically  endowed.  The  governing  body  is  represented  by
a  function  which  maps  agents'  monetary  lobbying  donations  into  a  relative
3
price.  By  entering  a  world  market  for  the  two  goods  at  some  cost  to  itself,
the  government  may  buy  and  sell  the  two  goods  as  necessary  to  clear  domestic
markets.
Our  findings  may  be  briefly  summarized.  First,  in  this  model  the
lobbying  equilibrium  (LE)  outcome  may  leave  both  traders  worse  off  than  they
were  at  the  competitive  equilibrium  (CE)  outcome.  In  this  case,  the
competitive  equilibrium  may  be  said  to  dominate  the  lobbying  equilibrium  by
Pareto's  criterion.  A  kind  of  Prisoner's  dilemma  has  obtained.  In  some
economies,  though,  there  is  no  Pareto  rank  ordering  of  the  two  outcomes.
That  is,  one  agent  is  better  off  at  the  CE,  and  the  other  at  the  LE  outcome.
It  is  these  cases  which  receive  the  most  attention  here.  Indeed,  it  shall  be
argued  that  many  or  most  of  the  real-world  political  situations  in  which
lobbying  behavior  gets  noticed  are  of  this  type.  That  is,  when  an  interest
group  is  very  successful  in  achieving  its  self-interested  political  or
3The  political  process  which  maps  individual  lobbying  efforts  into
resulting  policy  outcomes  is  obviously  very  complex.  All  of  the  steps  in
this  process  are  here  condensed  into  a  single  functional  mapping  from  groups'
political  efforts  into  an  intervention  price.  For  one  political  scientist's
criticism  of  this  choice  of  representation  of  political  institutions  and  the
source  of  political  supply,  see  Nelson  (1988,  p.  817).economic  goal,  it  very  likely  faces  an  opponent  which  for  some  reason  does
not  marshal  an  effective  lobbying  campaign  of  its  own.
While  the  lobbying  program  is  the  foundation  of  the  model,  our  interest
is  in  whether  still  another  mechanism  might  be  available  which  would  achieve
an  allocation  which  dominates  it.  (In  making  these  comparisons,  the  lobbying
equilibrium  is  adopted  as  a  benchmark  or  status quo.)  Two  such  alternative
mechanisms  are  explored.  The  first  calls  for  the  government  to  announce  a
constant  pricing  function,  which  rules  out  lobbying,  and  to  implement  an
income  transfer  scheme  in  its  place.  In  most  instances,  this  program  is
successful;  schemes  are  available  whose  outcomes  dominate  the  lobbying
equilibrium.  When  neither  the  CE  nor  the  LE  outcome  dominates  the  other,  the
redistribution  program  can  usually  dominate  the  lobbying  outcome.  However,
it  appears  that  even  this  may  not  always  be  possible.
The  second  alternative  calls  for  the  two  agents  to  cooperate,  ignoring
the  lobbying  program  in  favor  of  an  arbitration  scheme  which  automatically
allocates  the  resources  so  as  to  maximize  the  gains  from  trade  away  from  the
lobbying  outcome.  When  the  competitive  outcome  dominates  the  LE,  it  is
natural  to  expect  agents  to  enter  into  a  program  which  could  unseat  the
lobbying  program  altogether.  Even  a  simple  unanimity  voting  arrangement  in
which  agents  may  select  one  of  the  CE  or  the  LE  would  succeed  against  the
4Consider,  for  example,  the  case  of  American  hops  growers.  They  are
better  off  with  the  present  Federal  hops  marketing  order  in  place  than  they
would  be  if  the  hops  market  were  operated  freely.  Consumers  of  hops,  each
slightly  worse  off  with  the  order  program,  in  aggregate  lose  very  much.  The
collective  action  problem  can  be  said  to  explain  why  hops  consumers  do  not
organize  to  oppose  the  order.  This  idea  is  not  explored  here,  although  the
interested  reader  may  consult  the  classic  work  by  Olson  (1965),  or  a  more
recent  account  by  Moe  (1980).
5lobbying  program;  both  would  vote  for  the  CE.  However,  if  the  CE  and  LE  are
noncomparable  by  the  Pareto  criterion,  such  a  simple  voting  rule  would  fail,
for each  alternative  would  receive  one  vote.  Still,  the  cooperative  game
would  yield  a  result  which  dominates  the  lobbying  equilibrium,  making  the
cooperative  setup  of  this  paper  more  general.
Devising  a  core  notion  which  regards  the  lobbying  outcome  as  the
reservation  utility  value,  a  nice  parallel  is  drawn  between  the  two
alternatives.  We  show  that  the  set  of  economies  in  which  the  government  may
improve  social  welfare  by transferring  income  correspond  exactly  to  the  set
of  economies  in  which  agents  should  cooperate  and  submit  to  arbitration.  The
"lobbying  core,"  suitably  defined,  is  equivalent  to the  set  of  allocations
which  government  may  achieve  through  appropriate  income  transfer  choice.
Finally,  our  results  suggest  that  the  lobbying  outcome  may  be  an
improvement  over  the  competitive  equilibrium  in  the  following  sense.  While
the  lobbying  equilibrium  cannot  dominate  the  competitive  equilibrium,  it  may
be  possible  for  the  LE  pair  of  utility  levels  to  lie  outside  the  set  of
utility  pairs  possible  in  the  underlying  economy.  This  result  has  so  far
resisted  attempts  to  rule  it  out  mathematically;  neither  has  such  an  example
been  discovered.  It  is  the  object  of  continuing  research,  but  evidence
supporting  its  likelihood  appears  in  Figure  3  below.
The  article  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  contains  a  description
of  the  lobbying  economy  and  a  definition  for  a  lobbying  equilibrium.  In
section  3  the  efficiency  criterion  is  defined  and  the  conditions  under  which
government  may  invoke  alternatives  are  specified.  Section  4  builds  the
cooperative  framework  and  specifies  when  agents  should,  given  the
opportunity,  collude  with  each  other.  The  fifth  section  includes  our results
6upon  the  lobbying  core.  Concluding  comments  appear  in  Section  6.
2.  THE  LOBBYING  ECONOMY  MODEL
The  basic  model  is  a  two-agent,  two-good  exchange  economy.  Goods  are
labelled  1 and  2;  agents  are  indexed  by  i  e  I  =  (1,2).  Throughout,
subscripts  denote  traders,  while  superscripts  denote  commodities.  Each
agent's  preference  ordering  ;i  over  elements  of  Xi  =  R2,  his  or  her
consumption set,  is  representable  by  a  continuous  utility  function
Ui  :  Xi  --  IR that  is  twice  differentiable  and  that  is  concave,  strictly
quasiconcave,  and  monotone  increasing  on  int(Xi).  For  x,y  in  Xi,  we  say
Ui(x)  a  Ui(y)  if  and  only  if x  i  y.  Agent  i  has  endowment  vector  w,  whose
-ith  element s  is  zero.  A price vector  is  a  pair  P  =  (p',p2)  a  R+2.  This
exchange  economy,  denoted  & and  consisting  of  the  two  agents  along  with  their
preferences  and  endowments,  in  which  consumers  treat  prices  parametrically,
underlies  the  lobbying  economy.
Let  the  budget set  of  agent  i  be  given  by  31(P,P-w)  =
{x  e  Xi  :  P.x  5  P-w().  A  competitive equilibrium for  @ is  a  pair  of
allocations  (xi'xi2 2 •=1, 2  and  a  price  vector  P*  =  (p1*,p 2*)  such  that
i)  agents'  chosen  bundles  xl  maximize  utility  on  i3(P,P-ol);  and  ii)  markets
clear.  A  standard  result  from  general  equilibrium  theory  guarantees  that
economies  satisfying  the  conditions  specified  above,  and  also  the  condition
P*  e  R+ 2 ,  have  non-empty  equilibrium  sets  (Debreu,  1959).
Agent  i's  demand xi(P,Pw 1i)  is  the  function  which  maximizes  Ui(x)  on
i~(P,P 'o).  We  assume  that  demand  functions  are  differentiable  on  Xi.
SThis  notation  is  interpreted  as  y- 1  =  (yl,...,y 1 i-,y 1+1,...  ,y)  for
any  n-dimensional  vector  y.Agent  i's excess demand is  given  by  zi(P,P*cal)  =  xl(P,Po•i)  - wt.  Aggregate
excess demand  is the  sum  of  individuals'  excess  demands:  z(P)  =  i  zi(P).
Under  this  formulation,  demand  functions  are  homogeneous  of  degree  zero  in
prices  and  income.  Prices  are  normalized  to  the  one-dimensional  simplex
A  C  R+..  Let  p  E  (0,1)  denote  the  price  of  good  1,  and  let  q  =  (1  - p)
denote  the  price  of  good  2.
For  our  purposes,  it  is  important  to  assume  that  the  equilibrium  price
vector  P*  is  unique.  (This  is  assured  for  exchange  economies  whenever  z(P)
is  such  that  for  all  prices  P,  all  goods  are  gross  substitutes  (see,  e.g.,
Arrow  and  Hahn,  1971,  p.  223).)  Let  P*  denote  the  unique  competitive
equilibrium  price  for  the  undistorted  exchange  economy.
To  this  competitive  framework  is  added  a  "government"  which  stands
prepared  to  alter  the  relative  price  in  the  economy  in  response  to  lobbying
on the  part  of  consumers.  This  price-setting  government  exists  as  a  result
of  the  society's  history  and  its  norms,  and  it  embodies  these  characteristics
as  well  as  any  goals  or  objectives  which  the  central  authority  incorporates
in  governing.  Each  consumer  may  choose  to donate  a  part,  q)j,  of  his  or  her
income  to  the  government  to  influence  the  government's  price  policy;  71  is
agent  i's  lobbying donation.  The  government  is  fully  specified  by  the
function  p  :  R2  --  (0,1),  given  by  p  =  p(ll,i 2),  by  which  it  sets  the  price.
Hereafter,  the  symbol  P  will  always  denote  a  price  pair  (p,q)  E  A;  when  it
refers  to  the  government's  mandated  price,  we  will  write
P(-i)  =  (p(n),(l-p(-n))),  where  n  =  (=h,42).
6This  function  is  very  much  like  the  political  "production  function"  of
Findlay  and  Wellisz  (1982,  1983)  and  of  Wellisz  and  Wilson  (1986).
8The  pricing  function  p(q)  will  be  assumed  to  satisfy  a  collection  of
conditions.  The  first  of  these  is differentiability:  (Al)  The  function  p())
is  C 1. What's  more,  if  neither  agent  chooses  to  lobby,  then  it  is  assumed
that  the  government  selects  the  competitive  equilibrium  price:
(A2)  p(O0,)  =  p.
Because  of  the  asymmetry  of  agents'  endowments,  and  under  the
monotonicity  of  Ui,  Mr.  1  is  made  better  off  by  an  exogenous  price  increase,
while  Ms.  2  is  made  worse  off.  This  divergent  interest  lends  to the  model
its  non-cooperative  nature.  The  following  assumption  ensures  that  agents'
lobbying  donations  have  the  effect  on  government  policy  which  they  expect,
and  also that  lobbying  expenditures  do  not  become  more  productive  at  the
margin  as  the  level  of  lobbying  increases.
(A3)  (Productive Lobbying).  p(0i,i~ 2)  is  strictly  increasing  and  concave
(resp.  strictly  decreasing  and  convex)  in  tq  (resp.  102).
The  final  restriction  which  will  be  placed  on  the  function  p() 1,0 2)
delivers  an  upper  bound  for  agents'  lobbying  activity.
(A4)  (Bounded Lobbying).  For  each  agent  i,  for  every  7h-i,  there  exists
an  q1 i(-i)  <  +  o,  depending  on  -.i,  sufficiently  large  so  that
That  is,  given  an  q. 1 -,  if  i  chooses  to  devote  n7(v-1)  to  the  government  in
lobbying  expenditures,  then  none  of  his  or  her  wealth  is  left  over  for
purchasing  goods  (see  Figure  1).  Formally,  ihi(.-i)  =  4x  e  IR+:P(x,-_i).-wi=x).
By  our  assumptions  on  p(7),  i1  (-.i)  is  single-valued;  that  it  is  a  continuous
function  of  7-i  follows  directly  from  the  continuity  of  p(7)).^i(q-i)
Figure  1.  Value  of endowment  wi  at the lobbying price with  )-i
given.  At  7,  =  i=  (-i),  P(f-)'c  = -i-
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P(971.T  i)0(atLet  P  =  (p  : R2  - (0,1)  :  p()  satisfies  (Al)  - (A4)  . A generic
element  p(-r)  of  P  is  called  an  admissible pricing function.  Here,  .attention
shall  be  restricted  to  pricing  functions  defined  over  IR;  let  P~  denote  the
subset  of  P  with  elements  so  defined.  Henceforth,  a  lobbying  economy  will  be
denoted  &  =  (( 1,w 1)1=1,2;  p(0))8
The  optimization  program  of  consumers  may  now  be  spelled  out.  Given  an
-,  the  set  of  triples  (xi,xif,ij) in  +IR  from  which  agent  i  may  choose  is
given  by
0i(-0) =  (x  ,xf,  I  1)  E  R  :  PUjri.-i)(x,xi2)  P(I,_)-i  - .
Given  -1,  agent  i  solves  the  problem
Mi(N-1)  max  (xj,x,)<(2-i)  Ut(xi,x  ).
Associated  with  this  program  is  a  demand  relation  different  from  our
x1(p,p-w1).  Given  a  pair  (hz,72), let  (  =  w  - 7 //p(()),  and  let
2  =  02  Q2/(1-p(-)).  Let  the  (after-lobbying)  budget  set  of  agent  i  be
given  as  1i(p(-);P(rl)'  i).  The  demand  relation  of  agent  i  arising  from
program  Mi(.ij)  may  now  be  defined  as  xi(p(r));P()-·  i).  After-lobbying
7The  government  goes  by  the  name  p(')).  However,  it  may  be  more  useful
to  think  of  it  as  a  randomizing  devise  (or  as  nature) which  chooses  an
element  from  the  set  ?,  as  in  Coggins  (1989).  One  may  also  envision  a
generalization  in  which  the  government  is  given  some  objective,  and  selects
an  element  from  P  to  maximize  this  objective,  and  so  that  the  resulting  game
between  agents  meets  the  requisite  equilibrium  condition.
8Note  that  the  full-blown  lobbying  economy  has  a  political  side  (the
function  p(q))  and  an  economic  side  (the  agents  and  the  goods  markets).  As
one  reviewer  has  pointed  out,  the  underlying  model  §  is  purely  economic;  it
has  no  political  element  at  all.  A  more  satisfying  specification  of  '
might  include  a  "nice"  political  side to  go  with  the  perfect  Arrow-Debreu
exchange  economy.
11excess  demand  z1  is  the  difference  between  xi  and  wi;  z  is  the  sum  of  z
over  i  E  I.  By  our  assumptions  on  preferences  and  p()),  the  relations  xt,
zi,  and  z  are  all  differentiable  functions.
The  function  p(i)  is  common  knowledge;  i.e.  both  agents  know  p(7Q)  with
certainty,  and  they both  know  that  their  opponent  knows  p,  etc.  Once  the
rule  p(y)  is  announced,  the  government  does  nothing  further  to  influence
agents'  choices.  It  simply  carries  through  on  its  promise  to enforce  the
price  p(7).  This  is  also  common  knowledge.
The  lobbying  program  will  usually  produce  a  disequilibrium  in  the  goods
markets.  The  usual  feasibility  restriction,  therefore,  will  not  serve  our
needs  very  well.  We  assume,  first,  that  the  two-agent  economy  is  small
relative  to  a  world  economy  in  the  two  goods.  The  world  price  is  assumed  to
equal  p*,  and  the  government  may  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world  without
transport  cost  in  order  to  clear  markets  and  to sustain  the  prices  determined
by  p(q).  The  quantity  (71  +  l  1)  is  the  government's  "revenue"  in  terms  of  a
(non-existent)  domestic  currency.  The  "cost"  of  supporting  p(0)  is
(P*  - P(q))°z(p(-)).9  Now,  second,  at  a  lobbying  equilibrium  the  following
feasibility  condition  must  be  met.
Definition:  Given  a  lobbying  economy  9,  the  6-tuple  (xj,x2f,  i)1=,2
is  government feasible  if  n(0)  =  (r  +  r2) - (P*  - P('))'z(p('r))  0.
Note  that  if  =I  =  2  =  0,  then  p*  =  p(i,0 2),  so that  n(O,O)  =  0.
An  equilibrium  for the  lobbying  economy  is  defined  as  follows.
9It  may  readily  be  verified  that  this expression  is  equal  to
P*  z(p(i));  adding  the  budget  constraints  of  the  two  agents  together  yields
the  equality  P(q)  z(p(rq))  =  0.  The  version  used  in  the  text  will  be  adopted
here  and  elsewhere,  though,  as  it  is  more  suggestive  of  the  cost  of  trade.
12Definition:  Given  a  lobbying  economy  @,  a  lobbying equilibrium,
denoted  LE(@),  is  a  6-tuple  (xi  ,xf*,O  ) =1, 2  satisfying:
i)  for  each  i,  (x*,x  ,2* )  solves  Mi(:*);  and
ii)  (xi*,xf2,7i)i = 1, 2  is government  feasible.
In  Coggins  (1989),  the  lobbying  economy  is  reformulated  as  a generalized
game  between  agents.  It  is  then  shown,  under  certain  conditions,  to  posses
an  equilibrium  at  which  agents  respond  optimally  to  each  other  in  their
lobbying  levels  and  in  which  the  government  is  capable  of  carrying  out  the
trade  necessary  to  clear  domestic  markets.  Throughout,  the  economies  under
consideration  are  assumed  to  meet  those  requirements,  so  that  the  existence
of  an  equilibrium  in  our  lobbying  economy  is  assured.
3.  WELFARE  IMPROVEMENTS  THROUGH  ALTERNATIVE  GOVERNMENT  POLICIES
The  model  upon  which  our  welfare  analysis  rests  is  now  complete.  It
features  a  price-setting  government  policy  which  is  not  without  a  real-world
counterpart.  In  American  agricultural  policy,  for  example,  many  commodity
markets  are  altered  by  Federal  pricing  programs.  What's  more,  these
policies  originated  from,  and  are  still  responsive  to,  the  very  interests
whose  product  markets  they  regulate  (Paarlberg,  1987;  Krueger,  1988).  The
question  to  which  we  now  turn  is,  what  affect  does  the  lobbying  program  have
upon  agents'  utility  levels?
There  is  no  one  unambiguous  answer;  rather,  one  of  three  possibilities
will  result.  First,  both  agents  may  prefer  the  lobbying  equilibrium  to  the
competitive  equilibrium.  This  is  the  prisoners'  dilemma  case,  for  the  price
policy  fools  everyone  into  choosing,  at  equilibrium,  a  lobbying  strategy
which  is  Pareto  dominated  by  the  joint  strategy  of  zero  lobbying.  Second,
13it  may  be  the  one  agent  prefers  the  LE  while  the  other  prefers  CE,  but  an
equivalent  welfare  position  is  achievable  in  the  lobbying-free  economy.
Third,  it  may  be  that  the  policy  so  favors  one  agent  (by  virtue,  perhaps,  of
being  more  "influential"  than  the  other)  that the  resulting  outcome  was  not
available  before.
In  all  but  the  last  instance,  we  show  that  if  the  government  were  to
choose  an  income  redistribution  policy  to replace  the  pricing  policy,  the  LE
outcome  might  be  improved  upon.  Such  a  policy  has  the  effect  of  returning
us  to  the  Pareto  optimal  set,  although  this  new  outcome  may  be  noncomparable
to  the. competitive  equilibrium.  In  the  third  case,  no  such  possibility  for
redistribution  exists,  and  we  shall  offer  some  intuition  for  why  this  is  so.
Before  proceeding,  a  few  additional  definitions  must  be  presented.  Note
that  if  i  =  0  for  each  trader,  then  the  competitive  equilibrium  obtains  by
assumption  (A2).  Our  interest  is  in  economies  with  strongly active  lobbying
outcomes;  those  at  which  all  agents  choose  to  lobby.  Thus,  in  the  sequel,
all  economies  shall  be  supposed  to  possess  equilibria  of  this  sort.
Definition:  Given  a  lobbying  economy  8,  a  strongly active lobbying
equilibrium, denoted  SALE(S),  is  a  colleotion  (xti(1),i)i=1, 2  satisfying:
i)  (xi(t),7i)1=1,2  is  a  lobbying  equilibrium,  and
ii)  *  e  R2+.
A  generic  element  of  the  set  of  strongly  active  equilibria  will  be
denoted  by  - E  SALE(M). 1
'oIn  Coggins  (1989),  it  is  shown  that  such  equilibria  do,  indeed  exist.
11Where  no  ambiguity  results,  a  strong  active  lobbying  equilibrium  for  g
will  be  denoted  t*',  it  being  understood  that  the  associated  consumption
bundles  are  given  by x(i*).
14Recall  the  after-lobbying  endowment  vector  (  1,c2)  =  c  e  R2+.  This
vector  provides  an  upper  bound  on  the  resources  available  for  consumption  in
the  after-lobbying  economy.  Let  F  =  ((x',x 2)  2  :  (xx 2)  - o  c  R2.
This  is  the  set  of  all  feasible  bundles  in  the  after-lobbying  economy;
without  trade,  consumers  face  this  resource  constraint.  Similarly,  let
F  =  ((x',x 2)  R2  :  (x,  x 2)  W:).  Clearly,  F  is  convex.  Since  w  e  IR2,  F  is
also  compact.  In  the  sequel,  for  the  pair  of  allocations  x  =  (x 1,x 2)  x  R4,
we  will  sometimes  abuse  notation  and  write  x  E  F.  Strictly  speaking,  of
course,  x  cannot  be  a  member  of  F;  here  it  is  to  be  understood  that  the  pair
(xI,x 2)  is  such  that  x,  +  x2  E  F.  The  feasibility  condition  is  now  defined.
Definition:  The  pair  of  consumption  bundles  (xl,x 2)  E  R4  is
feasible (resp.  tilde-feasible) if  xi  +  x2  e  F  (resp.  if  xl  +  x2  e  F),
where  xl  +  x2  denotes  vector  addition  in  the  plane.
These  definitions  provide  the  groundwork  necessary  for  our  domination  and
optimality  definitions.
Definition:  For  the  lobbying  economy  9  and  a  corresponding
e  SALE(@),  let  be  as  defined  above.  We  say  that  the  pair  of  vectors
x  =  (xl,x 2 )  E X1  x  X2  is  dominated if  there  is  a  pair  y  =  (Yl,y 2 )  e  X1  x  X2
such  that  yi  >i  xi  for  each  i  E  I  and  such  that  y1  +  y2  E  F.  x  is
tilde-dominated if  such  a  y  may  be  found  with  yl  +  y2  E  F.
Definition:  For  the  lobbying  economy  @ and  a  corresponding
7*  E  SALE('),  let  o  be  as  defined  above.  We  say  that  the  feasible  pair  of
vectors  x  =  (x1 ,x 2 )  e  X1  x  X2  is  optimal  if  it  is  not  dominated.  The  set  of
optimal  pairs  is  denoted  PO(g).  The  pair  x  is tilde-optimal if  it  is  not
tilde-dominated.  Since  F  >  F,  x  is  tilde-optimal  whenever  it  is  optimal.
15Finally,  for  each  i,  for  any  xl  E  Xi,  let Li(xi)  =  {y  e  Xi  :  y  ki xi.
Li(xi)  is  the  upper level  set of  x,  for  agent  i.  It  consists  of  all  bundles
in  Xi  which  stand  in relation  ki to  xi. For  convenience,  let
GI  =  L1(x 1(i*)). Let  G2  =  (W - L2( 2(X2 )))  n  IRS~,  and  let
G2  =  (w  - L2(x2(q*)))  A  RS 2. These  sets  are  the  intersections  of  reflections
of  L2( 2('2*))  about  the  endowment  points  c) and  w,  respectively,  with  IR$.
By  the  concavity  and  the  continuity  of  the  U i,  the  Gi  are  convex  and  closed,
respectively.  We  will  adopt  the  notational  convention  that  x  e  G  whenever
both  xi  E  G1  and  x2  E  G2. The  vector  x  in  this  case  is  restricted  to  its
projection  on  X1. Finally,  let  G  =  G1  n  G2  C  R.2,  and let  the  interior  of  a
set  A  c  Rm be  denoted  int(A).  We  note  that  int(G)  =  int(G1  n  G2)  =
int(Gi)  n  int(G 2 ),  being  the  intersection  of  convex  sets,  is  also  convex
(see  Figure  2).
It  may  seem  that  welfare  comparisons  between  x(n*)  and  allocations
which  exhaust  the  after-lobbying  endowment  w  would  be  instructive.  This  is
not  so,  however,  for  while  x(7g*)  need  not  be  feasible  in  F  it  is  not
dominated  there  either.  Proposition  1 demonstrates  this;  it  relies  most
heavily  upon  the  monotonicity  and  strict  quasi-concavity  of  utility
functions.  Following  this  result,  Proposition  2  establishes  that  the  LE
cannot  dominate  x*.  In  other  words,  it  cannot  be  that  both  agents  prefer
x(Ir));  if  one  of  them  does,  then  the  other  must  prefer  x.  These  two
results  are  stated  in  sequence  here;  their  proofs,  and  those  of  all  of  the
propositions  of  the  paper,  appear  in  the  Appendix.
'2Specifically,  for  any  set  A  c  IR,  by  -A  we  mean  the  set
-A  =  {a  Rm :  -a  E  A).  If  c  e  Rm, then  (c  - A)  =  {a  e  R m:  (c  - a)  e  A).
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Figure  2.  The  lobbying economy  with the  better than lobbying
set  G.
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1Proposition  1.  For  the  lobbying  economy  9,  if
(xi(7),l)i=1,2  e  SALE(M),  then  x(-*)  is  not  tilde-dominated.
Proposition  2.  For  the  lobbying  economy  0,  suppose  that
(xi (v7),*)1i=1,2  E  SALE(S),  and  consider  the  competitive  equilibrium  outcome
(x*,P*)  in  9.  x(7•)  does  not  dominate  x.  That  is,  if  xi(*)  21  x'  for
some  i,  then  x-i  >-i  x-i(  ).
The  "better  than  lobbying"  set  G  will  prove  to  be  a  valuable  intuitive
and  technical  aid  in  the  remainder  of  this  section.  Elements  in  G  are
allocations  which  are  feasible  without  trade  and  which  dominate  the  lobbying
equilibrium.  As  one  might  expect,  then,  if  the  CE  outcome  x  is  in  G,  it
dominates  x(-*).
Proposition  3.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  9,  with  associated
competitive  equilibrium  outcome  (x*,P*)  in  the  underlying  competitive
economy.  x.  dominates  x(-*)  if  and  only  if  x'  e  int(G).
Now,  suppose  that  x*  4  G.  As  suggested  by  Figure  2,  this  means  that
one  agent  must  prefer  xl(-*)  to  x.
13
Proposition  4.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  0,  with  associated
competitive  equilibrium  outcome  (x*,P*)  in  the  underlying  competitive
economy.  Suppose  that  x*  4  G.  Then  there  is  an  i  in  I  such  that
X1(  )  >1  xi.
'3This  possibility  is  given  numerical  (if  not  empirical)  support  in
Coggins  (1989).  There,  numerical  experiments  show  that  this  possibility
results  in  example  economies  with  ordinary  (Cobb-Douglas)  utility  functions
and  a  simple  functional  form  for  the  pricing  function.  As  has  been  noted,
many  of  the  highly  publicized  lobbying  situations  also  leave  one  side  better
and  the  other  worse  off than  if  the  policy  were  nonexistent.
18Obviously,  without  a  more  fully  developed  contextual  model,
recommendations  as  to  whether  this pricing  policy  should  have  been  put  in
place  are  not  compelling.  Still,  even  at this  level  of  abstraction  there  is
a  valuable  insight  to  be  extracted,  for  the  result  depends  upon  the  price
line  pivoting  quite  a  lot  in  one  direction  or  the  other.  (In  Figure  2,  it
pivots  in  Mr.  1's  favor.)  This  corresponds  to  a  pricing  policy  which  is
heavily  influenced  by  one  trader.  The  link  between  G  and  the  optimality  of
x(r*)  is  made  even  tighter  in
Proposition  5.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  9.  The  lobbying
allocation  x()*)  is  dominated  if  and  only  if  int(G)  *  0.
This  result  says  only  that  whenever  the  interiors  of  Gi  and  G2  meet,
there  are  feasible  allocations-pairs  of  consumption  bundles  in  F-which
both  traders  prefer  to the  lobbying  outcome.  In  some  sense  this  is  a  first
step  toward  the  real  goal  of this  section,  for  it  is  allocations  such  as  this
which  the  income  redistribution  scheme  shall  be  asked  to  achieve.  Only  when
G  *  0  is  such  a  thing  possible,  as  demonstrated  in  the  next  two
propositions.  The  first  is  preliminary  in  nature.  It  shows  that  if
int(G)  *  0,  then  this  set  intersects  the  contract  curve.
Proposition  6.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  '.  Whenever  int(G)  o  0,
int(G)  nr PO(C)  *  . That  is,  if  int(G)  is  non-empty,  then  it  contains  an
optimal  point.
Suppose  now  that  the  government  may  implement  lump-sum  income  transfers
between  agents,  selecting  the  function  p(q)  a  p*  to  rule  out  lobbying
19altogether.
14  Alternatively,  and  more  in  the  spirit  of  our  "government  as
nature"  construct,  suppose  the  randomizing  device  selects  the  constant
function  p(7))  p  ,  and  that  this  random  choice  is  bundled  with  a  particular
transfer  scheme.  May  such  an  alteration  in  the  model  itself  be  expected  to
make  a  Pareto  improvement  possible?  Before  answering  this  question,  a  last
definition  is required.  A  competitive  equilibrium  has  been  defined  as  a  pair
of  allocations  and  a  price  vector  such  that  agents  optimize  under  the
resource  constraint  defined  by  the  property  rights  system  (W1,W 2),  and  such
that  markets  clear.  A  more  general  notion  of  equilibrium,  to  be  employed
here,  is  that of  an  equilibrium  relative  to  a  price  system,  in  which  only  the
aggregate  endowment  a  matters.
Definition.  Take  a  competitive  economy  @ =  (  itW)i=1, 2.  An
allocation  x  E  F  is  a price equilibrium relative to the  price P  e  A if  for
every  i  in  I,  y  E  Xi  and  y  >1  xi  together  imply  that  P-y  >  P-xi  (preference
maximization).
It  shall  be  shown  that  every  allocation  x  in  int(G)  r  PO(@)  is  a  price
equilibrium  relative  to  some  price  P.  That  is,  each  Pareto  optimal  member  R
of  the  interior  of  G  may  be  achieved  by  an  appropriately  specified  transfer
program  (which  depends  on  P),  and  the  equilibrium  outcome  of  such  a  program
dominates  the  lobbying  outcome.
Proposition  7.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  S,  and  suppose  that
int(G)  n  PO(S)  *  0.  Then
'4If  the  lobbying  price  identically  equals  p  over  H,  and  if  the
preferences  of  agents  are  strictly  monotone,  it  is  apparent  intuitively  (and
also  easily  demonstrated  mathematically)  that  no  agent  will  ever  choose
1)  >  0.
20i.  Any  x  e  int(G)  n  PO(§)  is  an  equilibrium  relative  to  some  price
P  E  A;
ii.  The  allocation  x  may  be  supported  by  an  income  transfer  of
P'(xi  - wi)  to  each  agent  i;  and
iii.  x  dominates  x(r1*).
Whenever  int(G)  *  0,  two  forces  join  to  inject  an  inefficiency  into  the
economy.  One  is  the  distortionary  price  and  resulting  movements  in  income
levels.  The  other  is  the  resulting  disequilibrium  nature  of  the  lobbying
allocation  itself  (markets  need  not  clear).  This  last  pulls  us  from  the
optimal  set  PO(g).  Stated  simply,  the  income  redistribution  scheme  pulls  us
back  to  it.
To  complete  this  section,  we  examine  a  final  possibility.  What  if  G  is
empty?  In  this  instance,  first,  by  Proposition  5,  one  agent  is  better  and
the  other  worse  off  at  the  CE  than  at  the  LE.  More  importantly,  no
allocation  feasible  without  trade  can  ever  deliver  this  utility  pair  (see
Figure  3).  The  two-agent  economy  has  exploited  the  rest  of  the  world,  buying
one  good  at  a  price  below  its  domestic  price  level,  and  selling  the  other  at
a  higher  price.
Proposition  8.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  g.  If  int(G)  =  0,  then
x()*)  is  not  dominated.
To  conclude  this  section,  we  discuss  briefly  just  what  would  have  to  be
true  of  8  in  order  for  G  =  O to  obtain  at 7'*  E  SALE(@).  Three
characteristics  of  the  economy  seem  important.  First,  all  else  equal,  G  =  0
is  more  likely  if  the  indifference  curves  "bend  sharply"  at  x(*').  This




Figure  3.  The  lobbying economy  with  G  =  0.
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Mifor  both  agents.  Second,  if  a  small  lobbying  contribution  by  both  agents
moves  the  price  a  great  deal  in  one  direction,  then  the  chosen  bundles
x 1(4*)  and  x2(Q*)  may  be  quite  distant  along  the  price  line;  this  makes
G  =  0  more  likely.  Finally,  if  a given  movement  in  prices  induces  a
relatively  large  shift  in  the  ratio  of  x1  to  x2  at  the  chosen  bundles,  then
we  are  more  likely  than  otherwise  to  find  G  =  0  at  T.
4.  WELFARE  IMPROVEMENT  THROUGH  COOPERATION
Given  that  the  lobbying  outcome  so  often  leaves  our  two  agents  in  a
suboptimal  position,  it  is  natural  to  ask  when  or  whether  they  might  take
advantage  of  an  opportunity  to  cooperate,  bypassing  the  lobbying  program.
In  this  section  we  provide  some  answers  to  such  questions.  Many  of  the
results  parallel  results  achieved  in  the  previous  section.  The  central
difference  is  that  here  we  work  with  the  utility  possibility  set  for  9,  the
image  set  of  F  under  the  vector-valued  function  U  =  (UI,U 2),  rather  than
with  F  itself.  Wlien  these  results  have  counterparts  there,  we  draw  the
links  to  the  government's  income  transfer  scheme.
The  analytical  tool  upon  which  this  development  relies  is  the
cooperative  game  theoretic  solution  concept  of  Nash.  We  suppose  that  agents
may  enter  into  binding  agreements  with  one  another.15  Such  agreements  are  in
one  sense  very  much  like  the  income  redistribution  scheme--they  pull  the
economy  to  a  Pareto  optimal  allocation.  Our  objectives  are  first  to  devise
a  framework  within  which  agreements  of  this  kind  are  meaningful  and
well-defined;  then  their  potential  for  attaining  efficiency  is  evaluated.
15Indeed,  the  primary  distinction  between  cooperative  and  noncooperative
games  is  that  such  agreements  are  possible  in  the  former,  and  not  in  the
latter.
23The  solution  concept  to  be  employed  amounts  to  an  arbitration  scheme
because  it  arises  from  a  prearranged  mechanism  which  lies  outside  the  game
itself.  In  this  sense,  the  agents'  opportunities  for  actively  choosing
among  alternatives  is quite  limited.  The  Nash  cooperative  solution  concept
or  the  Nash  fixed  threat  bargaining  game,  which  we  adopt,  effectively
precludes  individual  action.  Once  the  game  is fully  specified,  the  Nash
outcome  is  unique  and  inevitable  from  the  viewpoint  of  agents  inside  the
model.  Still,  the  cooperative  outcome  may  be  evaluated  against  the  various
alternatives.
One  of  the  two  basic  building  blocks  of  a  two-person  Nash  cooperative
game  is  the  set  of  attainable  utility  pairs  U c  R2.16  This  set,  to  be
referred  to  as  the  utility  set,  has  a  deep  and  fundamental  connection  to  the
allocation  space  and,  in  particular,  to  the  feasible  set  F.
Definition.  Given  a  lobbying  economy  8,  the  utility set Uc  R2  is
the  set of  utility  vectors  (Uz,U 2)  achievable  by  feasible  allocations.  That
is,  U  =  {(Ui,U 2)  E  R2:  For  some  x  E  F,  U1  =  Ui(xi)  for  each  i  E  I).
An  important  feature  of  the  bargaining  game  formulation  employed  here  is
that  we  must  use  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  expected  utility  functions.
This  implies,  among  other  things,  that  while  the  solution  concept  for the
cooperative  game  is  invariant  under  affine  transformations  of  the  U 1,  it  is
not  so  under  arbitrary  monotone  transformations.
The  set  U  is  the  image  under  the  function  U  =  (Uz,U 2)  of  the  set  F  of
16Being  the  image  under  a  continuous  function  of  the  compact  set  F,  U  is
also  compact.  As  the  utility  functions  representing  preferences  2i  are
invariant  to  location  shifts,  we  may  take  the  range  of  Ui  to  be  the
non-negative  portion  of  R.  In  this  case,  minx  FUi(xi)  =  0. xeF
24feasible  allocations.  Since  the  Us  are  assumed  concave  for  every  agent  i,  U
is  a  convex  set.17  Elements  of  U will  be  denoted  variously,  and  without
confusion,  as  U(x)  or  as  U(q7),  where  in  the  latter  case  the  intermediate
variable  xi(q)  is  understood  to  be  the  argument  of  Ui.  Note  that  by
definition  U(x)  a  U(y)  if  and  only  if  xi  i  yi  for  every  i.  Let  I  denote
the  set  of  elements  on  the  northeast  boundary  of  U.  That  is,
6  =  {(Ui,U 2)  E U  :  U'  U  and  U'  *  U  imply  U'  o  U . Clearly,  elements  of  Uo
are  images  of  optimal  allocations  in  F.  While  the  function  U  need  not  be
one-to-one  on  all  of  F,  it  turns  out  that  when  preferences  ki  are  strictly
convex  and  monotone  on  Xi,  U  is  one-to-one  on  the  set  of  optimal
allocations.  That  is,  the  pre-image  of  an  arbitrary  U  e  U  is  unique  in  F.
The  required  definition  of  a  cooperative  game  may  now  be  built  up  from
the  utility  set  U.  Let  U*  denote  the  pair  U(x*)  e  U which  obtains  at  the
competitive  equilibrium  allocation.  This  vector  is  optimal;  thus,  it  is  on
the  boundary  of  U.  Let  Z  =  (y  E  U  :  y  5  UU  denote  the  set  of  elements  of  U
less  than  U*.  Let  U(7*)  represent  the  utility  pair  arising  from  the
equilibrium  lobbying  vector  7*  E  IR. (see  Figure  4).  In  addition  to  U,  the
bargaining  model  consists  of  a  utility pair  which  is  designated  as  the  threat
point; these  utility  levels  will  fall  to  agents  in  the  absence  of  an
'7This  fact  is  apparent  when  one  notes  that  for  any  pair  x,  x'  of
feasible  allocations,  for  any  A  e  [0,1],  x"  =  Ax  +  (l-A)x',  is  also  feasible
by  the  convexity  of  F.  Thus,  by  the  concavity  of  U1,  Ui(x")  aXUI(x)  +
(l-A)Ui(x'),  so  that  U(x")  e  U.
'8In  fact,  the  connection  between  6  and  PO(S)  is  stronger  than  this.
When  preferences  are  strictly  convex  and  monotone  (which together  imply  that
they  are  strictly  monotone),  U  is  a  bijection  on  PO(@)  (see,  e.g.,
Mas-Colell  (1985,  p.  155,  Proposition  4.6.2)).  We  are  not  interested  in  the
fact  that  U  is  onto  6  over  PO(S).
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Figure  4.  The  utility possibility set U.
26agreement.  Note  that  either  agent,  finding  the  potential  bargaining
agreement  unacceptable,  may  choose  to  lobby  at  the  level  r'.  In  this  case,
his  or  her  opponent  can  do  no  better  than  to  lobby  -*i.  Thus,  we  will  always
take  the  threat  point  to  be  U(q*).  This  assumption  is  made  explicit  in  the
following  definition.
Definition.  Given  a  lobbying  economy  9,  its  corresponding  fixed
threat bargaining game,  denoted  Ng,  is  given  by  the  pair  Ng  =  (U,U(r  )).
As  a  solution  to  the  game  Ng,  we  seek  a  unique  element  U  of  U which  is
supportable  as  a  reasonable  outcome  of  the  bargaining  process.  While  other
choices  are  available,  the  Nash  solution  will  be  adopted  here.  The  Nash
cooperative  solution  to  Ng  is  defined  by  the  following  conditions.
(C1)  U  a  U(7*)  for  every  player  i;
(C2)  If  N'  =  (U',d')  is  related  to  Ng  by  U'  =  {y  R+:xi  =  aizi  +  b,
i  =  1,2;  y  e  U)  and  d  i  =  aiUi(-)  +  bi  for  every  i,  where
ai  R++,  bl  IR, then  Ui  =  aiUi(q*)  +  bi ,  i  =  1,2;
(C3)  If,  for  N',  Ui(t*)  =  U2(q*)  and  (xi,x 2 )  e  U whenever  (x 2,X 1)  E  U,
then  U'  =  U;  and
(C4)  If,  for  N',  d'  =  U(q*)  and  U'  e  U, then  0'  =  0.
In  short,  the  Nash  solution  to  a  game  Ng  may  be  characterized  as
follows.  It  selects  the  unique  element  of  U  which  maximizes  the  product  of
gains  from  agreement  (Ui  - U1(i*))'(U2  - U2(T*)).  If  the  point  U(q*)  is
regarded  as  the  origin  of  a  translated  coordinate  system  in  R 2,  then  U  will
be  the  point  on  the  boundary  of  U which  is  tangent  to  the  highest
rectangular  hyperbola  touching  U  (see  Figure  5).
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Figure  5.  The  cooperative solution U.
28discussion.  Let  us  now  turn  to  the  central  goal  of  this  section--
determining  the  possibilities  for  this  game  to  achieve  an  outcome  which
everyone  prefers  to  the  lobbying  game  result.  It  turns  out  that  this  is
possible  in  all  but  a  few  cases.
Earlier,  we  showed  that  if  the  CE  outcome  x*  is  a  member  of  G,  then
8
both  traders  will  prefer  xi  to  their  lobbying  allocation  xli(7*).  But  x  is
in  G  precisely  when  U(-)  is  in  Z.  What's  more,  if  x*  e  int(G),  then  U(-*)
lies  away  from  the  Pareto  optimal  set  0.
Proposition  9.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  9.  The  following
statements  are  true:
i.)  U(-*)  E  Z  if  and  only  if  x*  E G;  and
ii.)  Ui(-*)  E  JU\i  for  each  i  whenever  x*  e  int(G).
When  x*  E  G,  we  might  say  that  all  traders  would,  given  the
opportunity,  vote  to overturn  the  pricing  program  in  favor  of  the  underlying
competitive  outcome.  However,  if  x* 4  G  we  know  that  one  agent  prefers  the
lobbying  outcome;  this  agent  would  not  favor  a  return  to  the  CE.  In  the
next  proposition,  the  statements  "x*  4  G  and  G  *  0"  and  "U(-*)  a U\Z"  are
shown  to  be  equivalent.
Proposition  10.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  @.  We  have  that
[x*  4  G  and  G  *  0]  if  and  only  if  U(-)  e  U\Z.
The  potential  usefulness  of  the  cooperative  game  framework  is  now
apparent.  While  a  voting  scheme  requiring  unanimity  to  unseat  the  lobbying
program  would  succeed  in  doing  so  whenever  x*  e  G,  it  would  fail  whenever
U(1*E)  e  U\Z.  Still,  the  cooperative  game  outcome  would  be  favored  by  both
agents  over  x(ri*).  Thus,  the  game  is  more  general  than  a  simple  voting  rule
29would  be;  it  may  achieve  optimality  when  the  vote  would  not.  Our  next
result  establishes  that  whenever  the  interior  of  G  is  nonempty,  both  agents
prefer  IU,  the  cooperative  game  equilibrium,  to  the  lobbying  outcome  U()*).
Proposition  11.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  @.  If  int(G)  #  0,  then
Ui  >  Ui (")  for  each  i.
Propositions  7  and  11  together  provide  the  deep  connection  between  the
alternative  government  policy  and  the  cooperative  game  framework.  They
demonstrate  that  cases  in  which  agents  may  collude  to  improve  their  own
welfare  positions  over  the  lobbying  result  coincide  precisely  with  cases  in
which  the  government  can,  by  redistributing  income,  improve  both.'  These  two
alternative  mechanisms  have  the  same  effect--both  return  the  economy  to  a
Pareto  optimal  situation.
Of  course,  in  the  real  world  price  policies  are  often  established  in
favor  of  lump-sum  income  transfers.  Further,  opposing  interests  do  not
often  collude  to  escape  the  prisoners'  dilemma  inefficiency  which  may  be
associated  with  lobbying  behavior.  Perhaps  the  original  formulation  is  more
realistic  than  these  later  alterations.  However,  these  results  surely  lend
support  to  arguments  that  lobbying  behavior,  or  political  behavior
generally,  are  inefficient.
Th& next  result,  which  actually  matches  Proposition  8,  tells  a  very
different  story.  Establishing  yet  another  fundamental  agreement  between  the
cooperative  approach  and  the  alternative  pricing  mechanism  approach  of  the
19The  reader  may  compare  the  result  in  part  iii)  of  Proposition  7  (which
says  xi  >i  xi(r*))  to  Proposition  11  (Ui  >  Ui('*)).  The  bundle  xi  resulted
from  an  income  transfer  scheme;  Ui  was  the  outcome  of  the  cooperative  game.
30last  section,  it  suggests  that  the  lobbying  program  may  resist  all  efforts
to  overturn  it.  For  if  G  =  0,  then  U('*)  lies  outside  of  U;  it  was  not
attainable  in  the  competitive  economy.
Proposition  12.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  @.  Suppose  that  for
some  i,  Li(xi(-*))  r  F  *  0.  If  and  only  if  G  =  0,  then  U(r*) i  U.
Thus,  precisely  when  there  is  no  opportunity  for  a  transfer  scheme  to
improve  upon  the  lobbying  outcome,  agents  cannot  reach  a  cooperative
agreement  which  both  prefer  to  the  lobbying  outcome.  While  a  game  in  which
U(t)*)  4  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  Nash  fixed  threat  bargaining  game,  it
does  have  a  place  in  the  cooperative  game  theory  literature.  Harsanyi
(1977)  calls  a  game  with  threat  point  outside  of  U a  negative embedded
bargaining game.  Agents  will  never  agree  to  cooperate  in  this  instance,  and
the  concept  is  usually  reserved  for  the  analysis  of  multi-play  or  repeated
cooperative  games.  Here  it  is  also  interesting  in  a  much  different  way.  It
turns  out  that  when  G  =  0,  the  lobbying core, suitably  defined,  is  also
empty,  so  that  no  opportunity  exists  for  coalition  formation  or
recontracting  to  improve  agents'  welfare.
5.  THE  LOBBYING  CORE
We  now  turn our  attention  to  this  analysis.  The  core  of  an  economy
consists  of  all  allocations  which  are  rational  for  agents  and  for  groups,  in
the  sense  that  no  coalition  of  any  size  may  assure  itself  of  more,  acting
alone,  than  it  is  given  at  the  core  allocation.  Put  another  way,  no
coalition  can  unilaterally  adopt  an  alternative  strategy  that  is  better  for
all  of  its  members.  Edgeworth,  in  1881,  proposed  that  an  equilibrium  for
exchange  economies  may  be  achieved  through  unrestricted  trade  between  agents
31and  groups  rather  than  through  market  transactions.  In  Edgeworth's
formulation  of  economic  equilibrium,  any  collection  of  traders  may  agree  to
redistribute  its  collective  endowment  among  its  members.  An  equilibrium  for
Edgeworth,  then,  is  any  set  of  trades  which  delivers  to  each  trader  at  least
as  much  utility  as  he  or  she  would  achieve  by  consuming  his  or  her
endowment,  and  to  each  possible  coalition  at  least  as  much  as  it  could
achieve  by  trades  only  among  its  own  members.
A  thorough  treatment  of  the  theory  of  the  core  of  an  economy  and  a
review  of  the  related  literature  may  be  found  in  Hildenbrand  (1982).  In
this  paper,  only  two  agents  populate  the  economy.  Opportunities  for
coalition  formation  in  this  case  are  quite  limited;  the  formal  definition  of
the  core  is  easily  formulated  as  a  result.
Definition.  For  a  lobbying  economy  &  =  ((2 1 ,w1 )1=1 , 2 ;  p(9)),  with
*  E  SALE(M),  the  allocation  x  e  Xi  x  X2  is  individually rational for agent i
if  xi  zi  wl.  x  is  individually  '*-rational  for agent i  if  xi  ;i xi(*).
Definition.  For  a  lobbying  economy  &  =  ((i,w>i)i=1, 2;  p()),  with
e*  E  SALE(G),  the  lobbying core,  denoted  LC(g),  is  the  set  of  allocations
which  are  optimal  and  which  are  individually  i*-rational  for  each  agent  i.
Implicit  in  this definition  is  the  assumption  that  perfect  information
is  available  to  agents  and  that  transactions  costs  are  zero.  The  core  does
not  rely  upon  a  specification  of  how  agents  find  each  other;  the  process of
transactions  is  not  spelled  out.  Edgeworth's  concept  of  the  contract  curve
and  recontracting  do  not  address  the  means  of  transaction  either.  If  there
are  many  outcomes  in  the  core,  the  theory  is  indeterminate  on  the  trading
outcome.  In  this  sense,  the  cooperative  Nash  solution  had  some  advantages
32in  that  it  did  specify  a  particular  outcome  U  (See  Harsanyi  (1977),  p.  142).
Our  objective  here  is  to  show  that  the  lobbying  core  is  empty  (so  that
no  possible  improving  exchange  from  x('*)  is  possible)  precisely  when  the
set  G is  empty.  The  core,  it  must  be  noted,  is  a  concept  entirely  free  of
prices.  Thus,  the  main  result  here  provides  a  third  link  between  the
possibility  for  competing  political  groups  to  reach  an  agreement,  and  for
government  to  achieve  an  outcome  by  transfers,  even  in  an  ideal  world,  which
would  be  welfare  improving.
The  lobbying  core  is  depicted  in  two  ways  in  Figures  6a  and  6b.  In  6a,
the  core  is  all  allocations  on  the  intersection  of  PO(@)  and  G.  In  6b,
the  corresponding  core  utility  pairs  are  seen  to  be  those  which' are  both  on
the  northeast  boundary  of  U  and  also  northeast  of  U(i*).  As  mentioned
earlier,  the  correspondence  between  these  two  sets  is  well-defined.  In
particular,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  pre-image  under  the  function
U(x)  =  (U1(x 1 ),U2 (x 2))  of  such  utility  pairs  is  single-valued  (that is,  only
one  feasible  allocation  can  map  to  a  point  in  0).  Without  providing  a  proof,
we  note  here  that  LC(@)  *  0  whenever  U(n*)  e  U.  In  particular,  if
U(N*)  e  int(U),  then  U  E  LC(G).  These  two  results  are  immediate  from  the
following  proposition,  which  is  our  primary  result  upon  the  lobbying  core.
Proposition  13.  Consider  a  lobbying  economy  9.  LC(=)  =  O  if  and
only  if  G  =  0.
Because  this  result  provides  a  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for
LC(S)  =  o,  we  may  conclude  directly  from  it  that  if  G  *  0,  then  LC(S)  *  0.
From  Proposition  7,  we  know  that  any  x  e  int(G)  n  PO(@)  may  be  achieved,
when  the  proper  price  system  prevails,  by  lump-sum  income  transfers  between
33The  lobbying core  in  commodity space.










Uzagents.  The  flip  side  of  this  notion  may  be  summarized  as  follows.  Given  a
lobbying  economy  9,  whenever  the  lobbying  outcome  delivers  a  utility  pair
which  was  unavailable  in  the  competitive  economy,  two  equivalent  conditions
hold.  First,  the  individuals  in  the  economy,  our  agents,  will  not  be  able
to  collude  or  agree  to  override  the  lobbying  game.  One  agent  will  resist
any  campaign  by  his  or  her  opponent  to  join  such  a  coalition.  Second,  there
will  be  no  transfer  of  income  by  which  government  could  achieve  for  agents,
through  a  price  mechanism,  an  outcome  which  society  prefers  in  any  sense
to  x().*).
6.  CONCLUSIONS
This  paper  has  attempted  to  answer,  in  a  new  way,  the  question  of  the
efficiency  properties  of  lobbying  behavior,  using  a  general  equilibrium  model
to  analyze  the  welfare  implications  of  a  generic  lobbying  institution.  We
have  provided  some  evidence  that  lobbying  behavior,  even  in  nicely  formulated
economies,  may  not  be  unequivocally  suboptimal.  Moreover,  rent  seeking
behavior  in  small  economies  which  may  trade  with  a  larger  world  economy  might
be  good  for  society  in  the  sense  that  utility  levels  after  lobbying  are
unachievable  by  a  corresponding  perfectly  competitive  economy.  Finally,  we
showed  that  for  our  model  instances  in  which  government  should  not  allow  a
lobbying  program  to  go  forward  coincide  precisely  with  instances  in  which
agents  should  ignore  it  anyway.
The  abstract  nature  of  the  model  is  at  once,  perhaps,  its greatest
virtue  and  its greatest  drawback.  A  formulation  of  this  sort  may  reveal
valuable  and  compelling  intuitions  about  the  underlying  phenomena.  And  more
complicated  analyses  tend  to  obscure  the  richest  of  these  intuitive
discoveries.  However,  the  model's  remoteness  from  the  real-world  phenomena
35it  seeks  to  understand  is  troublesome.  Currently,  further  research  is
underway  which  draws  the  model  nearer  to  reality  by  creating  an  imperfection
in the  basic  economy  which  legitimately  calls  for  government  intervention.
The  government  is  also  given  an  objective  of  its  own;  it  chooses  a  pricing
function  from  the  set  P  so  as  to  maximize  this  objective.  By  allowing  the
policy  choice  to  vary  dynamically,  we  may  begin  to  approach,  on  a  theoretical
level,  the  goal  suggested  by  Gerber  and  Jackson  (1989)  of  making  both
institutional  formation  and  preference  formation  endogenous.  With  these
improvements,  the  enterprise  promises  to  offer  clearer  and  finer  insights
into  the  workings  of  the  political  economy.
36APPENDIX
This  appendix  contains  the  proofs  of  the  propositions  stated  in  the
paper.
Proof  of  Proposition  1.
Take  such  a  (x 1 i(*),7)  =1, 2  E  SALE(M).  By  preference  maximization,
for  every  y  E  int(G1),  we  claim  that  P(-*)-y  > P(-)')x 1(*T).  To  see  this,
suppose  not:  There  exists  z  e  int(GI)  with  P(-*)-z  - P((-*)-xl(7*).  Then  by
monotonicity  and  continuity  of  preferences,  there  is  an  c  >  0  sufficiently
small  so  that  z'  =  (z  - (c,e))  E  int(G1).  But  then
P(i')-z'  < P(').*)z  P()')*)x i(i*).  Although  z'  >1  x(7)),  z'  was  available
when  xi(,*)  chosen,  violating  the  preference  maximization  of  xI(D'),  and
establishing  the  claim.  Similarly,  for  every  y  E  int(L2(x 2(i*))),
P(-*)  y  >  P(7)*)  x2 (7*).  Thus,  by  the  definition  of  G2 ,  for  every
y  e  int(G2 ),  P(  i).Y  <  P(7  *)'X 1(7*).  It  follows  immediately  that
int(G1)  n  int(G 2 )  =  0.  (A.1)
Now,  suppose  that  there  exists  xo  =  (x ,x  )  which  dominates
(x1 (Q*),x 2(7*).  We  derive  a  contradiction  to  (A.1).  By  the  strict
convexity  of  preferences  and  the  definition,  x?  e  int(Gi).  Also,
x2  e  int(L2(x 2()*))),  and  by  the  definition  of  G2,  x1  - o  - x4,  so  that
xE  e  int(G2 ).  Finally,  xf  e  int(GI)  n  int(G2),  contradicting  (A.I).  We
conclude  that  x(ih)  is  not  tilde-dominated,  which  completes  the  proof  of
Proposition  1.  a
Proof  of  Proposition  2.
The  proof  is  carried  .out for  i  =  1;  the  case  i  =  2  is  largely  the  same.
37We  proceed  in  two  steps.  First,  it  is  shown  that  p(q*)  >  p*  whenever
xl(-*)  lz x  . Then  we  show  it  follows  that  x2  >2  X2 (').
i)  Suppose  that  x1(i*)  zi  x1 . We  have  that
P*  x(O')  - P*  xC  =  P*WI  > P*  z.  (A.2)
The  first  inequality  follows  from  preference  maximization  and  the  last  from
the  definition  of  Lz  and  the  assumption  z1  > 0.  The  equality  follows  from
monotonicity  of  preferences.  Monotonicity  also  implies  that
P(7'*)- xl(7)  =  P(p7)"  )  (A.3)
Subtracting  (A.3)  from  (A.2)  and  rearranging,
(P*  - P('q))"*x 1(')  >  (P*  - P(1o)-•z,
which -may  be  rewritten  as
(P*  - P(  P  ))*C(x(7t)  - oz)  > 0.  (A.4)
The  second  vector  in  this  inner  product  has  first  element  x,((*)  - wi  - 0;
its  second  element  is  x2(iq)  - 0  > 0.  Thus,  the  first  element  of
P*  - P(q*),  namely  p*  - p(i*),  must  be  strictly  negative;  otherwise  we  would
have  p*  - p('*)  - O,  which  would  violate  (A.4).  We  conclude  p(Oi)*  >  p,
which  was  to  be  shown.
ii)  Suppose  now  that  p(n)*  >  p'.  We  must  show  that  x2  >2  X2(*).  Let
the  unique  scalar  c  be  such  that  P*'x 2('*)  =  c(l-p*).  Because  p(7))  >  p*,
we  know  that  c(l-p*)  < P*' 2. Thus,  we  have
P*  x 2(  *)  =  c(l-p*)  < P*  W2  < P*2  =  P  X.*  (A.5)
The  last  equality  holds  by  monotonicity,  while  the  last  inequality  is  due  to
7  >  0.  From  eqn.  (A.5),  x 2(  ')  was  available  at  the  price  vector  P*,  when
x2  was  chosen.  By  strict  convexity  of  preferences,  then,  x4  >2  x 2(q*).
This  completes  the  proof  of  Proposition  2.  a
38Proof  of  Proposition  3.
To  show  necessity,  suppose  that  x*  dominates  x(q*).  It  follows
immediately  that  x4  >i  xl(7r*);  thus  x1  *  int(G 1 ).  What's  more,
x2  e  L(x 2(i*)),  so  that  o  - x2  e  int(G2).  Thus,  xC  e  int(G).  Sufficiency
follows  from  the  definition  of  G.
Proof  of  Proposition  4.
Suppose,  to the  contrary,  that  x  21i  x(  *) for  every  i.  By  the
definition,  this  implies  that  x*  E  G,  contradicting  the  hypotheses  of  the
proposition,  and  completing  its  proof.
Proof  of  Proposition  5.
To  show  sufficiency,  suppose  that  xo  dominates  x(-*).  Then
x>  >i  xi(r*),  which  implies  xf  int(G1).  Similarly,  x4  e  int(L2(x2(*).
Since  xo  was  assumed  feasible,  x4  =  w  - x4.  It  follows  immediately  by  this
construction  that  x4  e  int(G 2 ).  Thus,  x?  E  int(G).  Necessity  follows  as  in
Proposition  3  above  if  we  take  an  element  z  of  int(G).  This  completes  the
proof  of  Proposition  5.
Proof  of  Proposition  6.
Suppose,  under  the  hypotheses  of  the  proposition,  that  z  e  int(G).  Let
GI  =  (w  - L2(c  - z))  n  R2.  By  continuity  of  preferences,  GI  is  closed;  it
is  also  convex.  Gi  is  contained  in  the  closed  ball  in  IR 2  given  by
B(O,r)  =  {x  e  ER 2  :  1xl  - r)  with  r  =  Hwll.  Thus,  GI is  bounded,  and  also
compact.  Since  it  is  continuous,  by  the  Weierstrass  theorem  the  function  U1
achieves  a  maximum  xf  on  the  compact,  convex  set  G|.  That  xf  e  bd(Gj)
follows  directly  from  the  monotonicity  of  Ui.  We  claim  that  xf  is  also
unique.  To  see  this,  suppose  to  the  contrary  that  there  is  an  x4  E  Gj,
39x?  4  xf  with  Ui(x?)  a  Ul(xf).  Then  for  A E  [0,1],
x  =  A-x  +  (1-A)*-x  E  GJ.  But  by  the  strict quasiconcavity  of  U1,
Ui(x  )  >  Ul(xf),  violating  that  x4  maximizes  U1  on  Gz.  Thus,  x1  is  unique;
by  construction  x4  zl  y  for  every  y  e  Gz.  Let  xf  =  - x z,  and  let
xz =  (x,x).  Also  by  construction,  x z  e  PO(e).
It  remains  only  to  show  that  xz  E  int(G).  We  have,  first,  that
x  -2  (W - z)  >2 x 2(4  ),  so  that  xZ  e  int(G2).  Further,  as  x z  maximizes  zi
on  Gz,  and  since  by  definition  xf  +  xj  =  W,  x  i  z  >Z  x1(Qq since
z  e  int(G1 ).  Thus,  xz  e  int(G),  as  was  to  be  shown.  This  completes  the
proof  of  Proposition  6.
Proof  of  Proposition  7.
In  carrying  out  the  proof  of  this  result,  we  will  need  an  additional
equilibrium  definition.  If  one  PJ  is  allowed  to  equal  zero,  then  the
allocation  x  may  not  maximize  preferences  for  all  agents.  A  weaker
equilibrium  condition  allows  zero  prices,  requiring  that  agents  who  are  not
maximizing  preferences  are at  least  minimizing  expenditures  at  x.
Definition.  Take  a  competitive  economy  @ =  (i 1,w1) 1=1, 2. An
allocation  x  E  F  is  a  price quasi-equilibrium relative to the price P  E  A
if  for  every  i  in  I,  y  E  Xt  and  y  zi  xi  together  imply  that  P-y  - P-xi.
(expenditure  minimization).
If  there  is  a  good  j with  PJ  =  0,  then  there  may  be  one  or  more  agents  who
are  not  maximizing  preferences  at  x.  Because  we  wish  to  promote  the  price  P
as  a  plausible  alternative  policy  instrument,  it  must  be  shown  that  for  any
x  e  int(G)  n  PO(&),  every  agent  is  maximizing  preferences  under  P.  Let  us
now  proceed  to  prove  the  proposition.
40i.)  The  first  part  of  the  proposition  will  require  showing  (a)  that  x
is  a  price  quasi-equilibrium  with  respect  to  P;  then  (b)  that  P  e  IR2;  and
finally  (c)  that  x  is thus  an  equilibrium  relative  to  P.
i.)  a.  Let  W =  Li(xj)  +  L2(x2).  Clearly  W, being  the  sum  of  convex
sets,  is  convex  in  R2.  We  have  that  2-=ixi  =  o e  W n  F  (see  Figure  A-l).
Also,  W  n  int(F)  =  0,  since  otherwise  there  is  a  y  with  yi  >1  xi  for  all  i
in  I  by  the  monotonicity  of  ;t,  violating  that  x  e  PO(g).  By  the  separating
hyperplane  theorem,  there  is  P  e  R2  with  P  *  0  such  that  P-(•ixi)  t  P-z  for
every  z  e  F,  and  such  that  P-z  a  Pl'(Zx)  for  every  z  E W.  Clearly,  P  r  0,
since  for  any  z  e  F,  to  - z.  Now,  suppose  that  there  is  xO  with  x?  i  xi  for
some  agent  i.  Then  x?  +  x.i  e  W, which  implies  that  P;-xi  P-xt
(expenditure  minimization).  Thus,  as  i  was  arbitrary,  x  is  a  price
quasi-equilibrium.
i.)  b.  Note  that  we  have  assumed  ow  E  1R2+.  Since  P  ￿  0  and  by  the
monotonicity  of  preferences,  P-(lixi)  =  P-  > 0.  Thus,  there  is  an  i  such
that  P-xi  > 0.  We  claim  that  for  this  i,  P-x?  > P-'x  whenever  x?  >i  xi.  To
see  this,  take  such  an  x?,  and  note  that  (1-e)  4x  li  xi  for  c  sufficiently
small.  Since  x  is  a  price  quasi-equilibrium,  (l-c).P-xP  -.  P0xi  > 0.  Thus,
P-xx  > 0,  from  which  P-x?  > (l-e)*P.xi  4  P1-x,  which  establishes  the  claim.
For  a  good  j,  define  y  by  y-  =  xi J  and  yJ  =  xý  +  1.  Then  y  >1  xi  by  strict
monotonicity,  from  which  it  follows  that  P-y  > P -x.  This  last  expression
yields  PJ  > 0,  and  because  j  was  arbitrary  we  have  that  P  e  IR+.
i.)  c.  It  remains  to  show  that  the  price  quasi-equilibrium  x  is  a
price  equilibrium  relative  to  P  whenever  P;  e  IR+.  Take  such  a  P,  and
suppose  that  x1i  0  for  agent  i.  By  the  argument  of  i.)  b.  above,  agent  i




Figure  A-i. Existence of an equilibrium relative to  a  price.
42maximizes  preferences  at  xi.  Finally,  at  P  E  R++,  each  agent  is  maximizing
preferences  at  xi,  so  that  the  definition  of  a  price  equilibrium  relative  to
P  is  satisfied  by  the  allocation  x.
ii.)  It  must  be  shown  that  if  each  agent  i  receives  transfer
ti  =  P-(xI  - w i)  (where  ti  <  0  simply  implies  that  i  pays  a  tax),  then  xi  is
supported  as  a  price  equilibrium  relative  to  P.  Agent  i  holds  goods,  before
the  transfer,  of  value  P-.i.  Immediately,  we  see  that  P-wi  +  ti  =  P.xi,
which  is  the  condition  required.
iii.)  That  x  e  int(G)  dominates  x(h*)  follows  directly  from  the
definition  of  G.  This  completes  the  proof  of Proposition  7.
Proof  of  Proposition  8.
See  proof  of  Proposition  5  above.
Proof  of  Proposition  9.
i.)  Under  the  hypotheses  of  the  proposition,  take  x*  E  G.  Then  by  the
definition  of  G,  Ui(xl)  a  Ui(xi(q*))  for  every  i.  To  show  sufficiency,
suppose  that  U(q*)  e  Z.  By  the  definitions  of  Z  and  of  U,  there  is
(xl,x 2 )  E  F  with  Ui(xI)  =  Ui*q)*).  Since  Ui(n*)  - UI,  we  have  that
x4  ki  xi(h*)  for  each  i.  Thus,  x  e  G1,  and  x  e  G2. Finally,  it  follows
that  x*  E  G.
ii.)  Suppose  that  x*  e  int(G).  Then  x4  >i  xi(  )  for  every  i  in  I;
from  this  it  follows  that,  in  particular,  Ui(x*)  > Ui(*) for  every  i,  so
that  U(7i*)  U.  Since  x *  F,  we  know  that  U(x*)  e  U.  This  completes  the
proof  of  Proposition  9.  u
Proof  of  Proposition  10.
(Sufficiency).  Suppose  that  G  <  0,  and  that  x*  a  G.  By
43Proposition  6,  there  is  an  i  with  UI(xi(i*))  > U'*,  from  which  we  conclude
U(m*)  4  Z.  In  showing that  U((*)  e  iQ,  two  cases  must  be  considered.  If
int(G)  =  0,  then  G  =  {x('*)}  is  a  singleton  set.  In  this  case,  x(7*)  is
in  F;  therefore  U(n*) e  U.  If  int(G)  *  0,  take  an  arbitrary  xO°  int(G).
By  definition,  xo  E  F,  so  that  U(xO)  E  U.  Since  for  each  i,  xf  ki  xih),
U(x?)  a  U(i*).  Thus,  U(T')  e  U.
(Necessity).  Suppose  that  U(O')  E  U\Z.  To  show  that  x*  G,  it
suffices  to  note  that  for  some  i  in  I,  by  the  definition  of  Z,
Ui(xl)  < Ui(xi(7*)).  Thus,  xi(q)  >1  x', from  which  we  have  x*  4  G.  It
remains  to  show  that  G  *  0.  We  consider  two  possible  cases.  If
U(i,)  e  U\i,  then there  is  a  scalar  a  > 0  such  that  U'  =  U(q')  + e-a  e  i,
where  e  is  a  2-vector  of  ones.  Clearly,  by  monotonicity,  U'> Ui(Q*)  for
each  i  in  I.  Since  U  is  one-to-one  on  PO(e),  there  is  a  unique  feasible
vector  x'  e  F  with  Ui(x')  =  U'.  By  construction,  x'  >1  xi(irp);  therefore I  I
x'  e  G.  Finally,  if  U(-') e  T5,  then  by  the  strict  convexity  of  preferences
and  by  the  definition  of  G,  {x(*')}  =  G.  Since  the  two  cases  considered  are
exhaustive,  we  have  shown  that  G  o  0.  This  completes  the  proof  of
Proposition  10.  a
Proof  of  Proposition  11.
0
By  Proposition  10,  U()*)  e  U\U.  Thus,  there  is  c  >  0  small  enough  so
that  B(U(i*);E)  n  R2 c  U\t  (see  Figure  A-2).  Now,  let
k  =  max  U  E B(U(i);c)  n  2  (Ul  - U1())(U2  - Uz2()  =  (1/2)*e 2 >  0.  But
since  B(U(7I);e)  n  R2  c  U\l,  max  U eL  (Ui  - Ui(*))  '(U  - U 2(i))
(Ui  - U1(i*))(  (U2  - U2(*'))  - k  >  0.  Thus,  since  Ui  < U1(*)i  is  impossible,
each  term  in  this  last  product  must  be  strictly positive.  We  conclude  that









IProof  of  Proposition  12.
(Sufficiency).  Suppose  that  G  =  0,  and  further,  under  the  hypotheses  of
the  proposition,  that  L2(x 2(7*))  n  F  *  0.  Consider  the  convex  set  G2  c  2.
As  was  shown  in  the  proof  of  Proposition  6,  there  is  a  unique  x=  E  G2  such
that  for  all  y  E  G2,  x  21  y.  Clearly,  setting  x  =  <w  - xi,  x°  €  PO(W).
Thus,  U(xo)  e  6.  We  know  x4  a  G1,  for  otherwise  we  would  have  (xf,x4)  e  G,
a  contradiction.  Thus,  xl(i')  E  int(Li(x?)),  so  that  Ui(xi(7())  >  U1(xf).
Since  xA  -2  x 2(s'),  U2(x•)  =  U2(x 2(q')); from  this  we  have  U(x('n))  a  U(x°),
proving  that  U(i')  4  U.
(Necessity).  Suppose  that  U(r')  Ui  and,  by  way  of  contradiction,  that
there  is  an  x  with  x  e  G.  By  Proposition  6,  there  is  an  x'  E  G  n  PO(&).
We  have  that  U(x')  e  0,  and  since  x'  «i  xi('*) for  every  i  in  I,  we  have
U(x(-*))  5  U(x')  e  U.  This  contradicts  that  U(x(7)*))  i  U,  and  we  conclude
that  G  =  0.  This  completes  the  proof  of  Proposition  12.
Proof  of  Proposition  13.
(Sufficiency).  Suppose  that  LC(G)  =  0,  but  by  way  of  contradiction
suppose  that  there  is  x°  with  xO  E  G.  If  xO  E  int(G),  then  by
Proposition  6,  there  is  y  E  G  with  y  e  PO().  This  y  is  in  the  lobbying
core  by  definition,  contradicting  that  LC(=)  =  0.  In  this  case,  we  conclude
that  G  =  0.  If  {x°o  =  G,  then  clearly  {(x0  =  LC(@),  another  contradiction.
Again,  we  conclude  that  G  =  0.  Finally,  if  xo°  bd(G),  but  there  is  an
x
1  e  G  with  xo°  x1,  then  by  the  strict  concavity  of  Ui,  there  is  a
y  e  int(G).  Proposition  6  again  guarantees  that  there  is  z  e  int(G)  with
z  E  LC(6)  as  above.  This  is  a  contradiction,  allowing  us  to  conclude  that
G  =  0.
(Necessity).  Suppose  now  that  G  =  0.  This  condition  implies  that
46(w  - xi)  4  L2(x 2(-*))  whenever  xl  e  L1(x 1(-*)).  But  by  definition  elements
of  the  lobbying  core  must  satisfy  the  two  conditions  xl  e  Li(x 1 i(*))  and
(W - x1 )  E  L2(X2(7)*)),  an  impossibility  in  light  of  the  preceding.  We
conclude  that  there  can  be  no  allocation  in  the  lobbying  core.  This
completes  the  proof  of  Proposition  13.  a
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